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I like markets. I think that on the whole commerce tends to make us better people, that trade is one of the
best mechanisms of cooperation in a pluralistic society, and that participation in the market will generally
increase our material wellbeing. Hence, insuring that everyone has the ability to participate in the market is
important. Generally, the best way to insure such participation is to create institutions that keep markets
competitive and remove barriers to entry. Contract and the search for new customers will do the rest.
I am not, however, a principled libertarian or anarchocapitalist or the like. At times history, habits, and
other institutions will result in a market from which some people are systematically excluded. I don’t think
that this is an inevitable result of markets, and I think that contract and competition do a better job of
insuring access than most folks (perhaps especially law professors) recognize. Still, no human institution or
set of practices is perfect, and this is definitely true of commerce. When such systematic exclusion occurs, I
think that antidiscrimination laws are justified to insure access. In a pluralistic society, however, I don’t
think that the case for such laws is particularly strong if we justify them on grounds other than access.
Living in a world in which others engage in acts that are an affront to one’s dignity or manifest unsavory
thoughts strikes me as part and parcel of the liberal ideal, and I don’t think that such things should be made
into legal wrongs, except in extreme cases like IIED torts.
Given my framework, I think that there is a deep irony in the current debates over religious exemptions and
antidiscrimination laws covering homosexuality. First, I think that such antidiscrimination laws are
justified where there are threats to the ability of gay citizens to participate fully and meaningfully in the
market. The strength of that justification, however, is empirically contingent in my book. In places where
there is widespread animosity towards homosexuality, the case for such laws is fairly strong. In places where
animosity towards homosexuality is confined to a small subset of the population, the case for
antidiscrimination laws is weaker.
I also think that antidiscrimination laws can burden religious exercise substantially. I actually don’t think
that the wedding cake baker or the wedding photography facts are particularly hard cases. There are lots of
people who believe that the celebration of gay marriage is wrong, sinful, and blasphemous. It is pretty
understandable that they would regard participating in such a wedding as sinful. One may disagree with
their moral or theological position (I do), but I don’t think that it is insincere, pretextual, or that the burden
placed upon them is trivial. Hence, regardless of the doctrinal rout by which one gets there – RFRA, state
constitutions, statutory carve outs, what have you – I think that exemptions in such cases make sense.
Where granting such exemptions doesn’t meaningfully threaten access to the market, fining the baker or the
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photographer strikes me as needlessly punitive and vindictive.
However, I think that the case for religious exemptions from antidiscrimination laws is also empirically
contingent. It is contingent in two ways. First, given the religious beliefs that command a following in
society, are there a lot of belief systems that are going to label providing services to gay customers or
employing gay workers as impermissibly sinful? Second, are there a lot of believers in these creeds? I think
that there is a lot of mindless animosity towards homosexuality and some of that mindless animosity drives
religious beliefs. There is less of this, however, than many secular liberals assume. I don’t think, for example,
that most conservative religious believers think that serving gay customers or having gay employees is
sinful, even if they believe that homosexuality is sinful. Rather, I think that the desire for exemptions is
largely about marriages, weddings, and perhaps family formation (IVF or adoption). And even there, I don’t
think that there are very many people – including conservative religious believers – that would actually use
such exemptions.
I may be wrong about both of those conclusions, and in some places I am pretty confident that I am wrong.
And this leads to the irony. In places where antidiscrimination laws are most justified we are the least likely
to get them through the political process. Those are also the places where granting broad religious
exemptions is most likely going to undermine antidiscrimination laws if they are enacted. On the other
hand, those places where there is the strongest support for antidiscrimination laws are also the places where
there is the least need for such laws and where the case against granting religious exemptions is the weakest.
Yet these are also the places where we are least likely to see religious exemptions from those laws.
All of this makes me pretty depressed. The incentives, it seems to me, is for the politics to become the most
toxic and destructive for both sides depending on the region. In crude terms, I think that in blue states
conservative religious objectors will likely be dealt with harshly and punitively. In red states, I think that
there is a real danger that in some places homosexuals will lack the ability to fully and meaningfully
participate in the market.
There are, however, two things that give me hope. The first and greatest source of hope is commerce itself. I
think that interactions and incentives in the market are likely to cool animosity and open opportunities. The
fact that most people don’t care a great deal about these debates and would rather get on with making a
living is deeply heartening. The other source of optimism for me is Utah, where the state recently expanded
antidiscrimination protection for LGBT folks, while carving out surprisingly narrow exemptions for religion.
Utah is not as encouraging as the market itself, however, because the law punted on most of the hardest
issues. Still it suggests that the rhetorical and legal tailspin that seems most likely to me in ideologically
homogenous spaces isn’t inevitable.
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